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Health care reform: Where do we go from here? 
 
Maine Policy Review (1994).  Volume 3, Number 3 
 
Will universal health insurance ever become a reality? In the following article, based on his 
address in October as the 1994 Margaret Chase Smith Lecturer, former Massachusetts 
Governor Michael S. Dukakis suggests that efforts to establish universal coverage will continue. 
He argues, however, that the success of these efforts depends on the public adhering to the 
principle that all citizens will contribute to a system of universal coverage. 
Michael S. Dukakis 
For those of us who have been fighting the battle for universal health insurance over the past two 
decades, 1994 was a frustrating and difficult year.  
A thoughtful, energetic and deeply committed young president had been elected in 1992. He had 
made health care reform a major issue in the campaign. He had begun work on it even before he 
took office in January of 1993. And he had asked his equally thoughtful, energetic and deeply 
committed wife to chair the task force that was asked to develop the details of the new program.  
Some people thought that the role the President had asked Hillary Clinton to assume was 
unprecedented. But students of history know that Eleanor Roosevelt was deeply involved in a 
whole host of issues during the New Deal. Roslyn Carter made mental health her issue during the 
Carter presidency. And Barbara Bush had devoted hours and hours of her time to the cause of 
adult literacy while her husband was president.  
Furthermore, many Republicans seemed to share the President's commitment to health insurance 
for all Americans, even though there was disagreement on some of the details. In fact, nearly two 
dozen Republicans, including Bob Dole, co-sponsored Senator John Chafee's bill that would 
have required all Americans to purchase health insurance for themselves and their families, 
coupled with a wide-ranging program of insurance and malpractice reform and subsidies for the 
working poor.  
In short, the stage seemed to be set for what some were calling the most important piece of social 
legislation since Social Security. And the reasons for what seemed to be a broad bipartisan 
commitment to the principle of universal health coverage were not difficult to find. The U.S. was 
paying twice per capita what virtually every other advanced industrial nation in the world was 
spending on health care. These other countries provided insurance coverage for everybody while 
we were unable to do the same for forty million of our fellow citizens. A deep and prolonged 
recession had been a painful reminder to many Americans that to be laid off in the U.S. meant 
not only losing one's livelihood but one's health insurance as well. And the quality of the 
American health system, while admittedly the best in the world for people of wealth and those 
with comprehensive insurance, was anything but the best if one had the misfortune to work for 
an employer that did not provide health insurance for its employees.  
Health costs had been growing for years at triple the rate of inflation. Small businesses in many 
cases found that it was impossible to insure their employees at a cost they could afford.  
And God forbid you had been sick, were sick, or might be sick. You could not insure yourself at 
any price, nor could your employer.  
What was even more troubling about the state of health care in America was that spending one 
trillion dollars per year and over fourteen percent of our gross domestic product on health care 
was not making us any healthier than our neighbors and friends in the other industrialized 
countries. In fact, our health outcomes were mediocre at best. The U.S. today ranks 17th in life 
expectancy. Cuba has a lower infant mortality rate than we do.  
Furthermore, we had been debating the issue for years. In fact, the first president to seriously 
advocate universal health insurance for America was a progressive Republican named Teddy 
Roosevelt. Harry Truman first filed legislation in the Congress for universal coverage nearly fifty 
years ago. Congress passed Medicare and Medicaid nearly thirty years ago. Presidents Nixon and 
Ford both proposed universal employer-based plans not unlike the Clinton plan in the 1970s. In 
short, the issue had been discussed, debated and dissected for decades. 1993 finally seemed like 
the year when big things were about to happen.  
So what went wrong?  
Why, when all the stars seemed to have lined up in just the right way, did Congress fail to 
approve not only the president's plan but any one of a number of variations that would have 
given us universal, or near-universal, health security?  
Let me begin by saying that I think the President and the First Lady deserve an enormous amount 
of credit for putting health care reform at the top of the national agenda. Without them we would 
not have had the year of debate and discussion we have had. Nor, in my judgment, without the 
threat of sweeping reform, would we have seen anything like the changes that are already taking 
place in the health care industry.  
Furthermore, secrecy in developing the President's plan was not the problem. It is true that 
refusing to release the list of members of the President's task force was an avoidable mistake. I 
used to tell my staff members in the governor's office that if they put some-thing in writing, they 
ought to expect that it would appear on the front page of the Boston Globe—and if they put 
"confidential" on it, guaranteed it would be a front page news story.  
But the process itself was about as open as any we have ever had. Eighty or ninety members of 
the task force were top Congressional staff people. The First Lady met repeatedly with members 
of Congress. The administration attempted to involve virtually every constituency in the health 
care world—and there are hundreds of them. And once the plan had been developed, both the 
President and Mrs. Clinton did dozens and dozens of town meetings, sometimes separately and 
often together. Kitty and I were at one of them in Deerfield Beach, Florida, and it was the closest 
thing to real communication between average citizens and the First Family I had ever seen.  
Nor should we be surprised that some of the issues involved in trying to make health insurance 
universal in this country were politically difficult. You cannot have universal coverage without a 
mandate — whether it is a tax mandate, an employer/employee mandate, an individual mandate, 
or a combination of all three. In fact, we have an employer mandate of sorts today that ought to 
have responsible members of the business community screaming for the kind of mandate the 
president proposed. Why? Because when seventy-five percent of the employers in this country 
do the right thing and insure their employees, they are forced to pay as part of their premium a 
hidden tax that represents the cost of free care to the employees of their competitors who don't 
insure. In some states, depending on the number of uninsured workers there are, that hidden tax 
can amount to twenty or twenty-five percent of the total premium. 
But ideology often triumphs over reason, even when the corporate bottom line is directly 
involved. It was perfectly predictable that an employer mandate would face opposition from the 
National Federation of Independent Business, the principal small business lobby in Washington. 
What was not so obvious was that the United States Chamber of Commerce would first endorse 
an employer mandate for all the right reasons and then do a 180 degree turnabout within a matter 
of months.  
Moreover, any effort to get the rate of increase in health care costs down to something close to 
the general rate of inflation, either through the creation of health alliances or the imposition of 
some kind of premium cap, was bound to generate opposition from health care providers, 
insurers and others in the health care industry who, not surprisingly, prefer no limits on what 
they can charge or earn.  
Three things, however, clearly did great damage to the President's effort.  
First, the fact that the president' s budget and economic program were not finally approved until 
early August meant that he could not bring health care reform to the Congress until September 
rather than May, as he had originally planned. Under the circumstances, serious debate on health 
reform could not begin until well into an election year, and the closer we got to the 
Congressional elections, the more difficult it was to get the kind of bipartisan consensus that 
everybody said they wanted. Bob Dole is a case in point. Early in the deliberations Senator Dole 
said that universal coverage was a must, and the only question was how to get it. As if to 
underscore that point, he was one of the most prominent co-sponsors of the Chafee bill. But the 
closer the debate got to the Congressional elections, the weaker the Senator's commitment 
seemed to be to anything worth passing. And as the public relations assault continued to mount 
on the President's plan, Senator Dole finally abandoned all pretense of support for a meaningful 
plan and even refused to participate in the work of the so-called "mainstream" group that 
included Republican Senators like Chafee, Danforth and Durenberger.  
Secondly, the president's plan and both the House and Senate bills that followed it were hit with 
an opposition campaign that Newsweek magazine estimates cost some $300 million, $100 
million of which was spent on paid television advertising alone. We have seen multi-million 
dollar television campaigns in political races; we have never seen anything quite like what 
happened this past year in which opponents of the president's plan outspent proponents on 
television by something like six to one.  
Finally, the president's plan — and the House and Senate Democratic versions — were done in 
by their complexity. Keeping it simple is always the best policy. Proposing a version of the 
health alliances first advocated by Alan Enthoven and the so-called Jackson Hole group would 
have introduced a new institutional layer of bureaucracy into what is already one of the most 
complicated and bureaucratic health care systems ever devised. Furthermore, suggesting that 
these alliances be given monopolistic purchasing power within their designated regions not only 
conjured up visions of a network of all-powerful entities accountable to no one but also 
dramatically changed the relationship between employers and their employees on health care 
issues, one of the strengths of an employer-based system.  
Now, in fairness to the President, he made it clear in his September 22 address to the Congress 
that his one bottom line was universal coverage and that he welcomed any and all suggestions, 
amendments and modifications that would improve his bill. But opponents seized on every 
paragraph and every comma of the plan to accuse the President of wanting a "government-run" 
health care system. Ironically, in recommending an employer-based system with non-profit 
purchasing alliances, the President bent over backwards to try to keep the government out of it. 
Furthermore, government already pays for over forty percent of the nation's health care, which 
makes suggestions that we keep the government "out of it" ludicrous on their face. 
In short, it was a difficult, frustrating and ultimately disappointing year for so many Americans 
who believe in the importance of universal coverage and felt that we would finally reach that 
goal.  
Is reform dead?  
So, where do we go from here? Is health care reform dead or can we learn from the lessons of the 
past year and begin to make some progress toward the ultimate goal of basic health security for 
all Americans?  
For one thing, public opinion has not changed all that much. $100 million in TV spots certainly 
created doubts about the President's plan in the minds of many of Americans. But the most recent 
national polls tell us that Americans have not backed away from the same basic concerns that 
made this one of the nation's most important domestic issues during the 1992 campaign.  
Seventy-two percent of us favor universal coverage. Seventy-three percent of the American 
people think we need meaningful cost control — and that the federal government is the only 
institution that can make it happen. Approximately the same percentage believe that employers 
should contribute to their employees' health insurance. And seventy-eight percent favor an 
increase in the cigarette tax to help pay for it.  
We have certainly learned several lessons in the past twelve months. And one of the things we 
might do in looking at 1995 is to pay more attention to what the states of this country have been 
doing over the past fifteen or twenty years. Because if we do, we might avoid some of the 
stumbles as well as the missed opportunities of 1994.  
And the state in which to begin is unquestionably Hawaii, which, alone among the fifty states, 
has been able to provide its people with virtually universal health insurance since 1974. Hawaii's 
system is simple, nonbureaucratic and very effective. All employers and employees must 
contribute to the cost of every employee's health insurance. There is a legislatively mandated 
core benefit package that must be provided by every insurer and health maintenance organization 
doing business in Hawaii. Coverage cannot be denied because of a preexisting condition. There 
is a single average rate for all businesses with under a hundred employees. The state buys 
coverage through the private market for the temporarily uninsured and those on Medicaid. There 
is a business hardship fund for all employers whose health insurance costs exceed five percent of 
their gross revenue.  
As a result, all but a tiny fraction of Hawaiians have health insurance. The Hawaiian health care 
system is very competitive. Health costs are equal to Canada's and some thirty percent below 
those on the mainland. This is even more remarkable in a state where the cost of living is thirty-
five to forty percent higher than it is in mainland states. And Hawaii's health outcomes are the 
best in the nation: the highest life expectancy and one of the lowest infant mortality rates in 
America.  
Don't let anyone tell you that this is because Hawaiians are all out surfing at three in the 
afternoon and sipping Mai Tais while looking at those magnificent sunsets. What makes the 
difference in Hawaii is that just about everybody has health insurance and goes to the doctor 
when they first get sick. As a result, Hawaiians spend about forty percent less time in the hospital 
than we do — and that saves a lot of money.  
Other states can teach us some things, too. The 1988 Massachusetts universal health law has not 
yet been fully implemented. But a modest surcharge on unemployment taxes of $16.80 per year 
per employee now provides sufficient funds so that all employees who have been laid off and 
their families can get health insurance while they are on unemployment compensation. 
California, Massachusetts, and a handful of other states have reformed their malpractice laws. 
Today in Massachusetts doctors are paying malpractice insurance premiums that are 
substantially lower than they are in comparable states.  
Failures at the state level can also teach us something. We made a serious mistake in 
Massachusetts in 1988 by not insisting on community rating for small businesses at the time we 
passed our employer mandate. States like Minnesota, which are trying to provide subsidies for 
uninsured workers without an employer mandate, have been forced to confront the obvious 
consequences of such a policy: subsidies without an employer mandate are an open invitation to 
employers to disinsure and are a guaranteed budget buster.  
Moreover, a complex system of subsidies based on income requires another massive bureaucracy 
— something its largely conservative supporters say they abhor. Efforts at the state level to 
create pooling arrangements that make it possible for small businesses to voluntarily insure their 
employees have not been very successful. And unless there is meaningful health cost control — 
right now health costs are still rising at double the rate of inflation — more and more employers 
will either drop coverage for their employees or continue to cut back on their contribution and 
the benefits they offer. In fact, the census bureau informed us last week that a million more 
Americans lost their insurance in the past year. There are now forty million of us without health 
insurance and two thirds of these forty-million are members of working families.  
One final and all-important lesson emerges from our experience at the state level. Despite 
strenuous reform efforts in many states and the success of the Hawaiian system, it is 
inconceivable that the states by themselves can do the job. The reason for this should be obvious. 
If one state decides to impose a requirement on its employers and their employees to insure and 
its neighbors do not, it will inevitably be hit with the charge that it is forcing employers out of 
the state. In fact, Hawaii is the only state that has reached the goal of universal coverage in part 
because it is a little difficult to move. No other state can claim that distinction.  
That does not mean that states should not continue to try. But it is highly unlikely that state 
efforts alone will move us rapidly toward the goal of basic health security for all Americans. 
Washington once again will be the battleground. And I would like to venture a few predictions as 
to what is likely to happen.  
First, the President will not give up the fight, although I suspect he will go back to Congress with 
a set of basic principles and then work with them to craft the best possible bill. But a lengthy and 
detailed bill like the one he sent Congress in September of 1993 is simply not in the cards.  
Secondly, a more conservative Congress is even less likely than the current one to give us 
legislation that will insure everyone in America. That means, I suspect, that it will be the so-
called mainstream proposal that will serve as the basis for a compromise plan. That bill was the 
product of a lot of work by a bipartisan group of Senators. It includes needed insurance reform. It 
might help to cut down on unnecessary forms and paperwork. Its proposed subsides for the 
working poor will help somewhat.  
But even if the plan that the mainstream group produced is enacted into law, some twenty 
million Americans will still be required to plead for care in the emergency rooms of hospitals 
because they do not have health insurance. And subsidies without a mandate, as we have seen 
from our experience at the state level, virtually invite employers to drop health coverage for their 
employees and look instead to the government for subsidies.  
Finally, our continued failure to require everybody in this country to contribute to the cost of 
health insurance will continue to impose a hidden tax in the billions of dollars on those 
employers and employees who do the right and responsible thing. That is not only poor health 
policy; it is grossly unfair. At a time when the real income of most Americans continues to 
decline and the gap between rich and poor is greater than in any other industrialized nation in the 
world, it raises serious questions about what both liberals and conservatives like to call an 
"opportunity society."  
There is, of course, one alternative that responds to the concerns of the overwhelming majority 
of Americans and does so without the complexity and bureaucracy that plagued the Clinton bill 
and some of its successors; that is a national version of the Hawaiian system. It is certainly 
simple. It has been tried and tested. It has produced remarkable results. And it takes advantage of 
the strengths of the private market while emphasizing that we will no longer permit the practices 
that have denied millions of Americans the health coverage that so many of us enjoy.  
This alternative does depend, however, on the basic principle that unless we all contribute to the 
system, it will be virtually impossible to provide health insurance for all. That was a major 
sticking point in the 1994 debate. It will continue to be so in 1995 and beyond. 
Michael S. Dukakis was the Democratic candidate for President in 1988. He declined to run for 
reelection as governor of Massachusetts in 1990. He currently is a visiting professor at 
Northeastern University's political science department.  
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